A força normativa dos precedentes: uma abordagem pragmática-discursiva

Abstract

This paper focuses on the figure of precedent. Brazilians constitutional and processes reforms lead off to a new expertise: the system of binding decisions. The primarily founded basis for this new model is the utilitarian interests and the production targets, which does not seem satisfactory to itsopposite side: the correct cognition and reasoning of justice. At first, this paper looks into the stare decisis technique: a sort of a mechanical system that searches the judicial court´s precedents, typical in countries with Common Law traditions. Reached certain conclusions, the author embraces the theory ideate by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy, mainly the qualitative assortment between rules and principles. After a review about the need to rely on a paradigm of discourse, this paper concludes that that theory of stare decisis and the model proposed by the legislatives reforms are insufficient in order to propitiate a full understanding of the whole precedent theory, and suggests a third kind of legal standard of law, endowed with legal force by means of reason, which was first conceived by Jürgen Habermas doctrine. With this new initial concept, the author proposes a new figure for the stare decisis cognition, by legal certainty, accountability, argumentative basis, etc. At last, finishes by rejecting the existing legislative model, arguing that it reveals the revival of a paradigm which has long surpassed: the judge as the mouth of the law