O indiciamento e a dignidade da pessoa humana

Abstract

The constitutional principle of presumption of innocence Indictment constitutes a genuine constraint upon a person. It insults one s honor, shatter one s image, hurts one s dignity.

The State has the right to punish one who violates the penal code. Nevertheless, in a democratic State, the exercise of jus puniendi will only be effected through a penal action. Therefore, by electing the person as the one who commits a crime and, consequently, formalizing his/her indictment without giving him/her at least the right to contest, the State will be sacrificing constitutionally-set principles, will be punishing the citizen before any court statement.

Although technically innocuous, there is no shadow of doubt that the non-penal effects of this act of investigation impose an actual punishment. It violates the constitutional presumption of innocence, further to violating the human being s dignity. On the one hand, there is the State jus puniendi. On the other hand, there is the dignity of a human being. On the pretext of exercising the jus puniendi, the State cannot ignore the constitutional guarantees. One cannot simply elect a defendant and impose on him/her the sanctions resulting from this act of investigation. Indictment, as set forth in the laws in force, leaves out the presumption of innocence, insults the person s honor and the person s image.The burden arising from this act, depleted of judiciality, which appoints the person as the major agent of the criminal offense, constitutes a severe social punishment to the citizen